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 In this appeal, the Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority (SEPTA) has asked us to overturn a 
district court decision reducing an award of costs under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 54(d).  The district court made this reduction in large 
measure because of the great disparity between the parties' 
financial resources.  We agree with SEPTA that the district 
court's reduction was not proper, and we therefore reverse in 
part. 
 Elizabeth Smith sued SEPTA under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C.      
§ 1983, claiming that SEPTA had fired her because of race and 
gender.  The case was tried before a jury.  SEPTA defended on the 
ground that it had fired Smith because she failed a breathalyzer 
test that was administered based on reasonable suspicion that she 
was under the influence of alcohol.  The jury returned a verdict 
for SEPTA, and our court affirmed the district court's judgment. 
 SEPTA then filed a bill of costs in the district court.  
SEPTA sought $8,715.12 -- $5,020.40 for court reporter fees and 
$3,694.72 for photocopying costs.  Smith objected, but the clerk 
of court taxed the full amount that SEPTA had sought.  Smith then 
moved for review by the district court.  Smith argued that 
  
certain costs were not taxable, and she also "beseech[ed] the 
Court, at the very least to reduce the award of costs to the 
amount of $4.357.56 (which represents 50% of the amount sought by 
defendant) in order to not punish plaintiff for filing suit and 
in order to not discourage the filing of civil rights suits."  
App. 206.  After a hearing, the parties stipulated that the 
correct amount of taxable costs was $6,928.17, and the district 
court further reduced this amount to $4,618.78.  The district 
court noted that two recent decisions in the district had reduced 
the costs taxed against the losing party based upon the 
"disparities" between the parties' "financial resources."  Dist. 
Ct. Op. 2.  The court then explained: 
 This action warrants a reduction of taxable costs for 
reasons similar to [those in the two previous cases].  
Plaintiff was employed as a cashier before termination 
by defendant and has limited financial resources; 
defendant is a large transportation authority with 
significant financial resources.  Plaintiff pursued a 
legitimate claim in good faith and raised a serious 
legal issue. . . .  Under these circumstances, the 
court finds that a one-third reduction in defendant's 
revised requested costs will result in an equitable 
distribution of costs.  Judgment will be awarded in 
favor of defendant and against plaintiff in the amount 
of $4,618.78. 
 
District Ct. Op. 3 (footnotes omitted).  SEPTA responded by 
taking the present appeal. 
 Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, "in the absence of a statutory provision otherwise 
providing, the prevailing party in an action at law was entitled 
to costs as of right; while in equity the allowance of costs to 
  
either party was subject to the court's discretion."  6 Moore's 
Federal Practice ¶ 54.70[3] at 54-321 (2d ed. 1994) (citations 
omitted).  Melding these two rules, Rule 54(d) provided a new 
standard for use in taxing costs1 in all cases.  It states in 
pertinent part: 
 Except when express provision therefor is made either 
in a statute of the United States or in these rules, 
costs other than attorneys' fees shall be allowed as of 
course to the prevailing party unless the court 
otherwise directs; but costs against the United States, 
its officers, and agencies shall be imposed only to the 
extent permitted by law. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) (emphasis added).  Under this rule, a 
prevailing party generally is entitled to an award of costs 
unless the award would be "inequitable."  Friedman v. Ganassi, 
853 F.2d 207, 211 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1042 
(1989).   
 In describing the limits on a district court's 
discretion to deny costs to a prevailing party, we have 
also held that "`the denial of costs to the prevailing 
party . . . is in the nature of a penalty for some 
defection on his part in the course of the 
litigation.'"  ADM Corp. v. Speedmaster Packing Corp., 
525 F.2d 662, 665 (3d Cir. 1975) (quoting Chicago Sugar 
Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 176 F.2d 1, 11 (7th 
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948, 70 S.Ct. 486, 
94 L.Ed. 584 (1950)).  The Chicago Sugar case provides 
the following examples of a "defection" that would 
warrant denying costs to a prevailing party:  "calling 
unnecessary witnesses, bringing in unnecessary issues 
or otherwise encumbering the record, or . . . delaying 
                     
1
.  These "costs" are listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.  "They do not 
include such litigation expenses as attorney's fees and expert 
witness fees in excess of the standard daily witness fee."  
Friedman v. Ganassi, 853 F.2d 207, 209 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 1042 (1989). 
  
in raising objection fatal to the plaintiff's case. . . 
." 
 
Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare, 758 
F.2d 897, 926 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 Here, the district court reduced the costs taxed in 
favor of SEPTA based in large part on the disparity in the 
parties' financial resources, but we hold that this decision 
exceeded the district court's equitable discretion under Rule 
54(d).  We reject the general proposition that it is 
"inequitable" to tax costs in favor of a prevailing party with 
substantially greater wealth than the losing party.  Acceptance 
of this general proposition would mean that large institutions 
such as SEPTA could be denied costs in most cases even when their 
unsuccessful adversaries could well afford to pay for them.  In 
this instance this would be unfair to those who must ultimately 
bear the burden of SEPTA's costs -- its customers and the 
taxpayers of the jurisdictions that subsidize it, though the 
public nature of SEPTA is not the basis for our discussion.  If 
the losing party can afford to pay, the disparity in the parties' 
financial resources seems to us to be irrelevant for purposes of 
Rule 54(d). 
 If the losing party cannot afford to pay, that party is 
not automatically exempted from the taxation of costs.  On the 
contrary, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and cases decided thereunder make 
clear that costs may be taxed against a party who is permitted to 
proceed in forma pauperis.  See, e.g., Washington v. Patlis, 916 
  
F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1990); Harris v. Forsyth, 742 F.2d 
1277, 1278 (11th Cir. 1984); Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 973 
(4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1151 (1982).  While these 
cases recognize that a district court may consider a losing 
party's indigency in applying Rule 54(d), the losing party in 
this case does not claim to be indigent, and the record does not 
establish that she is unable to pay the full measure of costs.  
 We therefore hold that neither the disparity between 
the parties' financial resources nor Smith's financial status 
provided a basis for reducing the costs sought by SEPTA.  
Moreover, after considering all of the factors cited by the 
district court and by Smith, we are convinced that the district 
court did not properly exercise its discretion in reducing the 
costs taxed in SEPTA's favor, for none of SEPTA's conduct in this 
litigation rendered the original fee award inequitable.  We will 
therefore reverse the order of the district court in part and 
remand for the entry of a judgment taxing costs in SEPTA's favor 
in the amount of $6,928.17.  Costs on appeal will also be taxed 
in favor of SEPTA. 
                       
 
